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BOOK REVIEWS 
TH£ CoMMERC£ PowER v:eru;us STA'l'£5 RIGHTS: Back to the Con-
stitution. By Edward S. Corwin. Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press. 1936. pp. xiv, 273. $2.50. 
While the slogan "Back to the Constitution" has been used from 
time to time by conservative advocates who desired a return to the 
ante-bellum principles of States Rights, it is interesting to find an 
author using it as the subtitle for a volume in which he rather con-
vincingly delineates a modem liberal theory of constitutionalism cal-
culated to solve some of the problems which have arisen in regard 
to the relation of federal and state power. In his preface the author, 
who is McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence at Princeton, says, 
" 'Back to the Constitution' is the motto of this small volume, and 
by 'Constitution' is meant the Constitution of George Washington, 
Alexander Hamilton, James Madison (the Madison of 1787, not of 
1798, nor of 1829), and of John Marshall; not the 'interested so-
phistications' of those later foster fathers of the Constitution, cer-
tain distinguished counsel who about 1890 began, with the too fre-
quent aid of a sympathetic Court, to enmesh the powers of the Na-
tional Government in 'a network of juridical niceties.' " It is the 
author's oelief that while the national government today exercises a 
much wider area of jurisdiction, its depth, or as he states, "the dis-
cretion of Congress in its exercise," is much less than was the case 
during the first hundred years of our national existence. 
Professor Corwin's general thesis is that while trade and indus-
try today are essentially national, there has not been achieved that 
distribution of state and federal power which one might readily ex-
pect to have developed as a result of the reorganization of our na-
tional economic life. For this rather static condition he assigns as 
the answer the fairly recent tendency of the Supreme Court to re-
strict rather than enlarge federal authority over the interstate com-
mercial life of the nation. It is obvious that from Gibbons v. Ogden 
to Hammer v. Dagenhart, there runs a strange judicial route. 
How the court arrived at the point which it has reached from the 
point at which it started forms the bulk of this interesting treatise. 
The author assigns as the principal doctrinal antecedents to the pres-
ent somewhat paradoxical constitutional theory and practice, six 
propositions. From each proposition, Professor Corwin dissents 
and ably supports his position with strong reasoning. 
The first proposition is : "That the framers of the Constitution 
conferred upon Congress the power to regulate commerce among 
the States with a different intent than the power to regulate foreign 
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commerce, with the result that the former power is of less scope 
than the latter power." So far as the actual wording is concerned, 
little fault can be found with the author's contention that the com-
merce clause endowed the national government with the same power 
to regulate interstate commerce as was given in regard to the two 
other kinds, but the reviewer remains unconvinced that other parts 
of the constitution, notably the due process clause and the tenth 
amendment, may not restrict the extent of this Federal interstate 
regulation. 
The second proposition, "That the power to regulate commerce 
among the States does not include the power to prohibit it," of 
course may be maintained only by the most vehement partisans of 
strict construction. But with the author's position in denying prop-
osition three, "That while Congress has power to restrain commerce 
among the States for the benefit of such commerce, this power is not 
available for the promotion of the general welfare in other respects," 
this reviewer is inclined to disagree. For, like propositions four and 
five, "That the reserved powers of the States constitute a limitation 
upon Congress's power to regulate commerce among the States and 
serve to withdraw certain matters from the jurisdiction of the latter 
power," and "That production is a subject which is segregated to 
the reserved powers of the States, and so lies outside the range of 
Congress's power to regulate commerce among the States," if these 
propositions be not retained to some degree then t.lte federal gov-
ernment, under the commerce power, would be permitted practi-
cally to supersede the states in their control of many of their internal 
affairs. That large scale production and organization of industry 
in general on a national scale does form almost a continuous process 
when these goods are destined largely for interstate markets must 
be recognized today. But the manufacture of goods, per se, does 
not constitute interstate commerce .. To that extent the decision in 
the Knight Case was legally sound. Where the court erred, in the 
reviewer's opinion, was in failing to recognize that a monopoly of 
production may operate as a bar to the unrestricted flow of goods 
in interstate commerce, as effectively as a border toll gate may do. 
It seems to adopt as a principle of constitutional theory, the author's 
view that the federal government should have power to regulate in-
trastate manufacture and production where, as is obvious, there is 
a direct and actual influence on interstate commerce and where pro-
duction and marketing form a single continuous process. 
With the author's denial of proposition six, "That Congress's 
purpose in enacting a measure is a judicially enforceable te5t of the 
validity of such measure if it invades the ordinary domain of the 
States," the reviewer is quite in accord. Where authority exists, the 
purpose or motive of congressional legislation is not justiciable, but 
where it does not, for example, in the Child Labor Tax Case and the 
A. A. A. Case (assuming that no federal authority existed to regu-
late production in each instance) it does not appear to the reviewer 
improper for the court to point out that such want of power cannot 
be remedied by attempting to use the taxing power for other than 
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purposes of revenue. With the holding in Hammer v. Dagenhart 
one may differ vigorously, but with the subsequent holding in the 
Child Labor Tax Case one must acknowledge the strength of the 
court's position. 
The author has shown great care in studying his material and as-
sembling it and has produced a strong and well documented work. 
Perhaps his thesis offers the best solution of the perplexing problem 
of federal and state relationship. The volume is marred somewhat 
by the frequency and length of quoted material. It might, perhaps, 
have been more desirable to paraphrase this material rather than 
quote directly. To refer to John Randolph Tucker's view of Fed-
eral authority over interstate commerce, as set forth in his work on 
the constitution, as "hocus-pocus" is extreme. And the author's 
emphasis on the fact that Mr. Chief Justice White had been a Con-
federate soldier is perhaps out of balance. 
But to all persons, national and states rights advocates both, who 
are interested in American constitutional theory, this book is rec-
ommended. The author's view that the existing defects in our con-
stitutional theory and practice, which have come about through our 
.economic development may be cured in a constitutional manner by 
the Supreme Court itself, affords an encouraging picture. 
THEODORE S. Cox. 
Williamsburg, Virginia. 
